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Abstract
A perceptual learning experiment provides evidence that the mental lexicon cannot consist solely of
detailed acoustic traces of recognition episodes. In a training lexical decision phase, listeners heard an
ambiguous [f–s] fricative sound, replacing either [f] or [s] in words. In a test phase, listeners then made
lexical decisions to visual targets following auditory primes. Critical materials were minimal pairs that
could be a word with either [f] or [s] (cf. English knife–nice), none of which had been heard in training.
Listeners interpreted the minimal pair words differently in the second phase according to the training re-
ceived in the first phase. Therefore, lexically mediated retuning of phoneme perception not only influ-
ences categorical decisions about fricatives (Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2003), but also benefits recog-
nition of words outside the training set. The observed generalization across words suggests that this
retuning occurs prelexically. Therefore, lexical processing involves sublexical phonological abstraction,
not only accumulation of acoustic episodes.
Keywords: Speech perception; Perceptual learning; Phonological abstraction; Episodic models;
Spoken-word recognition
1. Introduction
Is knowledge stored in long-term memory as multiple episodes or as abstract prototypes?
This question concerns, in the domain of language processing, the nature of the mental lexicon.
According to episodic theories (Bybee, 2001; Goldinger, 1998; Hawkins, 2003; Johnson,
1997a, 1997b; Klatt, 1979, 1989; Pierrehumbert, 2001, 2002), the lexicon contains multiple
detailed traces of spoken words that the listener has previously encountered. These episodic
traces include, for example, acoustic details that are specific to the way a given speaker talks.
Listeners can indeed retain detailed perceptual information about individual tokens of spo-
ken words (for a review, see Goldinger, 1998). The critical question, however, is whether these
episodic representations constitute the basic substrate of the mental lexicon or should be con-
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sidered simply an adjunct to representations that are primarily abstract in nature. We argue
here that evidence that listeners can show sensitivity to episodic detail should not be taken as
evidence against abstract representations; further, we argue that the lexicon cannot consist
solely of episodic traces.
We present data on perceptual learning in speech recognition that can only be explained by
postulating abstract lexical representations. These data challenge any extreme episodic model
in which there is no abstraction over the information in the speech signal prior to lexical access.
According to such models, word recognition entails a comparison of the current input in all its
detail with previously stored lexical episodes. In abstractionist accounts, however, word recog-
nition is mediated by abstract prelexical representations. The speech input is mapped onto ab-
stract phonological representations, which may, for instance, be features (Gaskell &
Marslen-Wilson, 1997), phonemes (Norris, 1994), features and phonemes (McClelland &
Elman, 1986), or syllables (Mehler, 1981). Lexical representations are specified in terms of
those sublexical prototypes. In some abstractionist models, such as TRACE (McClelland &
Elman, 1986), word representations are nodes in an interactive–activation network, and their
abstract phonological content is coded in terms of the connections between those nodes and
prelexical representations. In other abstractionist models, such as Shortlist (Norris, 1994), the
phonological content of lexical representations is stored in the mental lexicon and is thus sepa-
rate from the prelexical level. In all models of this class, however, lexical representations are
phonologically abstract, and the prelexical level acts to categorize the information in the
speech signal in terms of sublexical units with the purpose that that information can make con-
tact with lexical knowledge. The fine acoustic detail in the signal, therefore, cannot be stored in
the lexicon.
Extreme abstractionist and extreme episodic models lie at opposite poles of a continuum of
possible models of spoken-word recognition.1 The critical contrast between the two ends of the
continuum is whether there is abstraction of the speech signal prior to lexical access. Here we
use a perceptual learning paradigm to test for evidence of this abstraction. Norris, McQueen,
and Cutler (2003) previously showed that listeners use lexical knowledge to retune
speech–sound perception. In a two-part experiment, Dutch listeners made auditory lexical de-
cisions to a list of words and nonwords, and then categorized ambiguous fricatives on an [εf] –
[εs] continuum. During the training phase (lexical decision), participants heard a fricative that
was ambiguous between [f] and [s] (henceforth referred to as [?]). One group of listeners heard
[?] replacing the [f] in [f]-final words (i.e., contexts that biased interpretation of [?] toward [f]
such as [wtlɔ?]; witlof is a Dutch word, witlos is not), plus unambiguous [s]-final words. A
second group had the opposite training conditions (ambiguous [s]-final and unambiguous
[f]-final words). The listeners with [f]-biased training categorized more sounds on the test con-
tinuum as [f] than those with [s]-biased training. They had retuned their fricative categories.
Why should listeners retune speech–sound perception? As Norris et al. (2003) argued, the
only reason would be to facilitate word recognition. They suggested that retuning the percep-
tion of individual sounds at an abstract prelexical processing level would make future recogni-
tion of other words containing those sounds faster. However, Norris et al. (2003) showed only
that listeners adjusted the way they categorized sounds in a task requiring a metalinguistic
judgment. It could be that the learning is restricted to tasks requiring explicit judgments and
that such judgments are based on postlexical phonological representations that do not play any
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direct role in word recognition. Both abstractionist and episodic models can include a
postlexical processing stage at which metalinguistic judgments about phonemic categories are
made as in, for example, the abstractionist Merge model (Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2000)
and the episodic models of Johnson (1997b) and Pierrehumbert (2002). Note, therefore, that
we are not claiming that extreme episodic models do not or cannot have representations of pho-
nemic categories. Our argument concerns the function that these categories serve in word rec-
ognition. In extreme episodic models, phonemic categories may exist as labels for clusters of
(components of) episodic traces but serve no abstraction function during lexical access. Be-
cause both abstractionist and extreme episodic models can have postlexical phonemic catego-
ries, the learning effect in phonemic categorization reported by Norris et al. (2003), therefore,
does not in itself distinguish between the two classes of models. What needs to be tested is
whether the retuning influences the perception of words that contain the critical ambiguous fri-
cative but that were not encountered in the training phase. An effect on newly encountered
words would suggest that the locus of the adjustment underlying the retuning is prelexical, and
that the adjustment reflects learning about abstract sublexical representations.
Therefore, we designed a new experiment that would test for lexical generalization. Spe-
cifically, we examined whether the adjustments induced by prior exposure would bias subse-
quent interpretation of minimal word pairs. These were Dutch words differing only in a final
[f] or [s] (cf. English knife–nice). The first phase of the experiment replicated the Norris et al.
(2003) training conditions. The second phase used cross-modal identity priming, with ambigu-
ous primes based on minimal pairs (e.g., [do?], from doof “deaf” versus doos “box”). Lis-
teners heard such primes and then made visual lexical decisions to letter strings, including doof
and doos, presented immediately after the primes.
The priming task allowed us to ascertain how listeners interpret [?]; lexical decisions (e.g., to
[do?]) would not tell us this. In cross-modal identity priming, responses to visual words are fa-
cilitated when the same word has just been heard (relative to after an unrelated word), but this fa-
cilitation is abolished when prime and target mismatch in one phoneme (e.g., in fate–fake;
Marslen-Wilson,Nix,&Gaskell,1995). If fricative learninggeneralizes tootherwords, listeners
with [f]-biased training should tend to interpret [do?] as doof, and so should make faster or more
accurate decisions to doof after hearing [do?] than after an unrelated prime. They should not
show such facilitation in responses to doos. Listeners with the opposite training should show the
opposite priming pattern. The patterns thus act as a diagnostic of how listeners interpret the
words and should, in turn, tell us how they interpret the ambiguous phoneme in those words.
Lexical generalization would support abstractionist models in which training causes
changes in prelexical fricative categories. If, for example, the listener has learned that the expo-
sure speaker’s [f] is more [s]-like than normal, and if this is coded at the prelexical level, then
the listener should tend to hear [do?] as doof. Generalization across words about sublexical
components is precisely what an extreme episodic model cannot do. A model storing only
acoustically detailed lexical episodes and using only those episodes in word recognition can-
not take advantage of any sublexical regularities during the word-recognition process. Storage
of traces corresponding to critical training trials (e.g., [wtlɔ?]) will not affect the goodness of
fit of [do?] to previous episodes of doof and doos. Even after training, listeners with this kind
of episodic lexicon would therefore have trouble identifying [do?]. They could compare it
with prior traces of doof and doos, but would have no grounds to prefer either interpretation.
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2. Method
2.1. Participants
Forty-eight members of the Max Planck Institute participant pool were paid to participate.
None reported any hearing disorders, and none had participated in similar experiments (e.g.,
those of Norris et al., 2003).
2.2. Materials and stimulus construction
The stimuli in the training phase were the same physical tokens, in the same order, as those
used in the two experimental conditions in the training phase of Experiment 2 in Norris et al.
(2003). There were 100 Dutch words and 100 phonotactically legal nonwords. Twenty of the
words ended in [f] and 20 in [s]; in all 40, substitution of the [f] by [s] or vice versa would make
a nonword. The sounds [f, s, v, z] did not occur elsewhere. In one condition, the final sound in
the [f]-final words was replaced with an ambiguous sound, [?], which a pretest showed was
midway between [f] and [s] (e.g., making [wtlɔ?]; witlof means “chicory”); the [s]-final words
were natural (e.g., naaldbos, “pine forest”). In the second condition, the [s]-final words ended
with [?], and the [f]-final words were natural (e.g., [naldbɔ?] and witlof). Norris et al. (2003)
listed these critical materials and specified how the stimuli were made and pretested.
The test-phase materials were based on 20 minimal pairs of monosyllabic Dutch words
(e.g., doof–doos). Mean frequencies of occurrence in CELEX (Baayen, Piepenbrock, &
Gulikers, 1995) of the [f]- and [s]-final items were 35 and 32 per million, respectively. Both the
f- and s-final versions served as visual targets. Spoken forms, ending with the ambiguous frica-
tive that was used in training, served as primes. Each ambiguous prime was paired with a pho-
nologically unrelated monosyllabic prime word (e.g., [do?] was paired with krop, “head” (of
lettuce); see the Appendix). There were another 40 word targets and 100 nonword targets, con-
taining no f or s. There were also 120 [?]-final filler primes (60 based on [f]-final words: e.g.,
raaf, “raven” and motief, “motif”; and 60 based on [s]-final words: e.g., kaas, “cheese” and
moeras, “swamp”; raas, kaaf, moties, and moeraf are meaningless) and 60 unambiguous prime
words. The unambiguous sounds [f, s, v, z] did not occur in the primes, which varied in length
from one to three syllables.
The talker who produced the training phase stimuli (a female native speaker of Dutch) spoke
the primes. Recordings were made and edited in the same way as in Norris et al. (2003). All fri-
cative-final words were recorded with a final [f] (i.e., [f]-final words were recorded as such, but
[s]-final words were mispronounced with a final [f]). The ambiguous primes were made by
splicing the ambiguous fricative onto each prime final vowel. This mirrored the earlier proce-
dure and ensured that any cues to place of articulation in the vowels always signaled
labiodental place. A natural token of each unambiguous prime was selected.
2.3. Design and procedure
The two training phase conditions were each paired with four versions of the test phase.
These four versions differed only in counterbalancing. Each contained all 40 critical targets
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(i.e., both members of all 20 minimal pairs). Ten f-final and 10 s-final targets were paired with
ambiguous primes, and the other 10 targets of each type were paired with unrelated primes.
Each version was also split into two halves, such that only one member of each minimal pair
appeared in each half. For any pair, if one target appeared after its ambiguous prime in one half
(e.g., doo?–doof), the other appeared after its unrelated prime in the other half (e.g.,
krop–doos). Stimuli were thus rotated over four versions, with, in any given half of any ver-
sion, five trials in each of the four conditions.
The four test versions also differed with respect to the [?]-final filler primes. Listeners who
heard [?] in [f]-final words in the training phase continued to hear [?] in [f]-final primes in the
test phase, and those who had heard [?] in [s]-final words during training continued to hear [?]
in [s]-final primes in the test phase. In each version, 60 filler targets were coupled with ambigu-
ous versions of either [f]- or [s]-final primes, depending on training. Twenty filler word targets
and 20 filler nonword targets were paired with unrelated ambiguous primes (e.g., word targets:
raa?–trein or kaa?–trein, depending on training, where trein means “train”; nonword targets:
motie?–weuk or moera?–weuk). The other 20 nonword targets in each version (necessarily dif-
ferent across training conditions) were paired with phonologically related ambiguous primes
(e.g., bla?–blap, after training with [?] in [f]-words; and kla?–klang, after training with [?] in
[s]-words).
Therefore, there were eight versions of the test phase (4 versions of the test stimuli, each
with 2 different sets of filler trials, conditional on training). The remaining filler trials with un-
ambiguous primes (10 identical, 10 related and 20 unrelated word targets, and 20 related
nonword targets) were always the same. Therefore, in all versions, there were 80 word targets
and 80 nonword targets, and ambiguous primes were just as likely to be followed by a related
target (word or nonword) as by an unrelated target (word or nonword). In trials where primes
were phonologically related to targets, there were equal numbers of trials where the target was
identical to the prime and where it differed only on the final phoneme (both for ambiguous and
unambiguous primes).
One pseudorandom running order was constructed for all versions of the test phase, with
never more than three words or nonwords in a row and with the critical trials well spaced.
Where possible, target order was identical across versions; otherwise, matched targets across
conditions (e.g., doof and doos) appeared in the same position. As in Norris et al. (2003), there
were two different running orders in the training phase, each of which was paired with all test
phase versions. Therefore, there were 16 stimulus lists in total, each presented to three partici-
pants.
Participants were tested in groups of up to three in separate carrels in a quiet room. Auditory
primes were presented over closed headphones. Visual targets were presented in lower-case
Arial letters on a computer screen at the primes’ acoustic offset. Written instructions for audi-
tory lexical decision were provided for the training phase (see Norris et al., 2003). Training
phase procedure was the same as in that study. New written instructions were given after train-
ing. Participants were told that they would continue to hear words over the headphones, but
that they would now also see letter strings. It was stressed that their task was now to decide, as
fast and as accurately as possible, whether the visual stimuli were real words. Responses con-
tinued to be made via two buttons labeled “JA” (yes) and “NEE” (no); yes responses were
made with the dominant hand.
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3. Results
Oneparticipant failed tofollowthe testphase instructions, sowasexcludedfromallanalyses.
3.1. Auditory lexical decision
Table 1 shows mean reaction times (RTs) and error rates in the training phase. These data
closely replicate Norris et al. (2003). The participants tested here were, on average, slower but
more accurate (compare Table 2 in Norris et al., 2003). As in the earlier experiment, partici-
pants were much faster (218 msec, on average) to say “yes” to unambiguous words than to am-
biguous words. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with either participants (F1) or items (F2) as
the repeated measure were carried out on the RT data. There were two factors: training condi-
tion ([f]- or [s]-biased; between-subject but within items) and final fricative ([f] or [s];
within-subjects but between items). Because of the between-subject design, the strong ambi-
guity effect appeared as an interaction between these factors: F1(1, 44) = 552.08, p < .001;
F2(1, 38) = 573.53, p < .001. Neither main effect was significant at the p < .05 level by both
participants and items.
Similarly, as in the earlier study, listeners judged most (i.e., about 90%) of the ambiguous
items to be words. There were more “no” responses to ambiguous items than to unambiguous
items, however, as revealed by an interaction of training condition and final fricative: F1(1, 44)
= 10.99, p < .005; F2(1, 38) = 5.02, p < .05. As before, there was also a main effect of fricative,
with more “no” responses to [s]-final items than to [f]-final items: F1(1, 44) = 27.13, p < .001;
F2(1, 38) = 7.33, p < .05. The effect of training condition on errors was statistically significant
only by participants: F1(1, 44) = 6.19, p < .05; F2(1, 38) = 3.69, p > .05.
3.2. Cross-modal identity priming
Table 2 shows mean RTs and error rates in the test phase. Fig. 1 plots priming effects (the
difference in RT or error rate to targets after ambiguous vs. unrelated primes). ANOVAs with
participants or items as repeated measures revealed a three-way interaction of prime type (am-
biguous vs. unrelated), target type (f-final vs. s-final words), and training condition ([?] in [f]-
vs. [s]-final words in training) both in RTs: F1(1, 39) = 15.07, p < .001; F2(1, 38) = 8.06, p <
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Table 1
Auditory lexical decision performance for the natural and ambiguous versions of the [f]- and [s]-final words
Natural Fricatives Ambiguous Fricatives
[f]-final wordsa [s]-final wordsb [f]-final wordsc [s]-final wordsd
Responses
Mean RT “yes” 119 160 354 360
Mean % “no” 2 5 3 14
Note. Mean correct reaction times (RTs; in milliseconds measured from word offset) and percentage error
rates are shown.
aFor example, witlof. bFor example, naaldbos. cFor example, witlo?. dFor example, naaldbo?.
.01; and in errors: F1(1, 39) = 9.87, p < .005; F2(1, 38) = 9.92, p < .005. These three-way inter-
actions show that the two groups of listeners responded differentially to f- and s-final words
preceded by ambiguous [?]-final primes. These critical interactions are examined in more de-
tail later. The only other effects that were significant by both F1 and F2 were: the interaction of
prime type and target type, RT: F1(1, 39) = 9.85, p < .005; F2(1, 38) = 8.14, p < .01; errors:
F1(1, 39) = 9.13, p < .005; F2(1, 38) = 6.43, p < .05; the interaction of target type and training
condition, RT: F1(1, 39) = 9.69, p < .005; F2(1, 38) = 13.11, p < .001; errors: F1(1, 39) = 8.44,
p < .01; F2(1, 38) = 5.53, p < .05; and, only in RTs, the main effect of prime type: F1(1, 39) =
25.96, p < .001; F2(1, 38) = 7.86, p < .01. Note that the differences between the two training
groups in the unrelated conditions likely reflect between-subject variability. The factor, First/
Second Half, of the experiment was not involved in any effects that were significant by both F1
and F2. The overall pattern was thus stable over the course of the experiment. The First/Second
Half factor was dropped from subsequent analyses.
The pattern of priming effects was therefore modulated as a function of both target type and
training conditions. Pairwise comparisons showed that there were priming effects only where
predicted. Participants given [?] in [f]-final words in the training phase were faster to respond
to f-final words after ambiguous related primes than after unrelated primes: F1(1, 23) = 30.31,
p < .001; F2(1, 19) = 9.89, p < .01. They were also slower to respond to s-final words after am-
biguous than after unrelated primes (significant only by participants): F1(1, 23) = 4.84, p < .05;
F2(1, 19) = 2.24, p > .1. However, participants given [?] in [s]-final words in the training phase
were faster to respond to s-final words after ambiguous related primes than after unrelated
primes: F1(1, 22) = 10.71, p < .005; F2(1, 19) = 14.94, p < .005. They were also faster to re-
spond to f-final words after ambiguous than after unrelated primes, but not significantly: F1(1,
22) = 2.43, p > .05; F2(1, 19) = 3.25, p > .05.
The participants given [?] in [f]-final words in the training phase also showed priming ef-
fects in their errors. They were more accurate in responses to f-final targets after ambiguous
than after unrelated primes: F1(1, 23) = 7.38, p < .05; F2(1, 19) = 4.93, p < .05. The inhibitory
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Table 2
Visual lexical decision performance for the f- and s-final words in each priming condition as a function of
auditory lexical decision training conditions











[?] in [f]-final words 609 695 689 663
[?] in [s]-final words 623 657 582 628
Mean % error
[?] in [f]-final words 1 7 11 4
[?] in [s]-final words 8 7 6 6
Note. Mean correct reaction times (RTs; in milliseconds measured from word onset) and percentage error rates
are shown.
aFor example, doo?–doof. bFor example, krop–doof. cFor example, doo?–doos. dFor example, krop–doos.
trend seen in RTs on s-final targets was significant: There were more errors on s-final words af-
ter ambiguous than after unrelated primes: F1(1, 23) = 15.15, p < .001; F2(1, 19) = 9.68, p <
.01. The participants given [?] in [s]-final words showed no significant priming effects in their
errors (all Fs < 1).
The pattern of priming effects was therefore stronger for the listeners given [?] in [f]-final
words during training than for those given [?] in [s]-final words. A similar [f]-bias was also ob-
served in the training phase, and in Norris et al. (2003). As Norris et al. (2003) argued, this bias
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Fig. 1. Test phase: Priming effects (the difference between target responses after ambiguous primes and those after
unrelated primes) for reaction times (RTs; upper panel) and error rates (lower panel) to f-final words (e.g., doof) and
s-final words (e.g., doos) for participants who were trained on the ambiguous fricative in [f]-final words (E1: [?] =
[f]) and for participants who were trained on the ambiguous fricative in [s]-final words (E2: [?] = [s]).
is presumably due to a shift in fricative cue weighting between the pretest and the main experi-
ments. All [s]-final words were made from natural [f]-final utterances, to control for place of
articulation cues in the vowel. These cues would have played a stronger role in lexical decision
and priming than in the pretest because the vocalic information in the pretest was constant and
therefore not informative for the [f]-[s] decision; but it was potentially distinctive in word rec-
ognition.
4. Discussion
Perceptual learning about speech sounds generalizes over words. Dutch listeners exposed to
an ambiguous fricative in [f]-biased lexical contexts such as [wtlɔ?] and to unambiguous
[s]-final words such as naaldbos learn to interpret that ambiguous sound as [f], whereas listen-
ers with the opposite training conditions (e.g., [naldbɔ?] and witlof) learn to interpret [?] as [s]
(Norris et al., 2003). We have shown here that these conditions also influence recognition of
fricative-final words that listeners have not heard during training. Listeners who heard ambigu-
ous [f]-final words during training produced reliable facilitatory identity priming in both RTs
and errors on f-final words (e.g., [do?]–doof), and inhibitory priming in the error rates on
s-final words (e.g., [do?]–doos). However, those who first heard ambiguous [s]-final words
produced reliable facilitatory priming on s-final words (in RTs only). Therefore, ambiguous
words such as [do?] tended to be interpreted as doof by the former group and as doos by the
latter group.
These results offer further support for the claim (Norris et al., 2003) that training on ambigu-
ous fricatives in lexically biased contexts leads to adjustments to the prelexical representations
of fricatives. If the effect observed in categorization by Norris et al. (2003) were due to adjust-
ments to postlexical phonemic categories (in either an abstractionist model such as Merge:
Norris et al., 2000; or an episodic model such as that proposed by Pierrehumbert, 2002), one
would not expect those adjustments to influence word recognition. Furthermore, the effects in
the priming task are not likely to be due to postperceptual processes. Because the prime–target
interval was 0 msec, there was no time for expectancy biases on target decisions to emerge
(Neely, 1977), or for the operation of postperceptual strategies (e.g., adjusting interpretation of
the ambiguous primes explicitly based on the training conditions). Instead, the learning effect
appears to reflect automatic, prelexical adjustments. In line with this automaticity claim,
McQueen, Norris, and Cutler (2006) and Eisner and McQueen (2006) showed that the learning
effect does not depend on explicit judgments about the fricatives during training.
Only models of spoken-word recognition in which there is a prelexical level of processing
that codes abstract phonetic information (i.e., that somehow represents the category distinction
between [f] and [s]) can account for these results. Such models are also supported by other re-
cent data showing generalization across the vocabulary of other kinds of phonetic learning
(Davis, Hervais-Adelman, Taylor, Carlyon, & Johnsrude, 2005; Davis, Johnsrude,
Hervais-Adelman, Taylor, & McGettigan, 2005; Maye, Aslin, & Tanenhaus, 2003). This ab-
stractionist view receives further support from other types of evidence including results from
word and nonword identification (Nearey, 1990, 2001), phonological priming (Radeau,
Morais, & Seguí 1995; Slowiaczek, McQueen, Soltano, & Lynch, 2000), and subliminal
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speech priming (Kouider & Dupoux, 2005); and results from studies on learning novel pho-
neme sequencing constraints (Onishi, Chambers, & Fisher, 2002) and on second-language lis-
tening (e.g., Cutler, Weber, & Otake, 2006; Pallier, Colomé, & Sebastián-Gallés, 2001; Weber
& Cutler, 2004). Recent results using the present lexically guided learning paradigm suggest
that prelexical representations are both abstract and flexible. In addition to these data, evidence
that learning can generalize to similar sounds (Kraljic & Samuel, 2006) and to the full range of
sounds used in the test continuum (Norris et al., 2003) suggests that the retuning involves pho-
nologically abstract representations. The flexibility of these representations is shown by the
fact that perceptual learning can be talker-specific (Eisner & McQueen, 2005), and that this de-
pends on the degree to which the manipulated phonemes encode talker-specific information
(Kraljic & Samuel, 2005, 2006).
These results challenge extreme episodic views of the mental lexicon. In models in which
there is no coding of the speech signal in terms of abstract sublexical representations prior to
lexical access, there is no way in which exposure to ambiguous sounds in lexically biased con-
texts could influence recognition of newly encountered words containing those same sounds.
In Klatt’s (1979) Lexical Access From Spectra (LAFS) model, for example, spectrograms of
the current speech signal are mapped directly onto a lexicon of spectral templates. Klatt (1979)
also proposed a phonetic analysis device, SCRIBER, which allows new vocabulary to be
learned when LAFS fails. Our results on generalization suggest, however, that phonetic analy-
sis is a necessary part of word recognition, such that adjustments to that analysis can influence
recognition of words that the present talker has not been heard to speak before but that are part
of the vocabulary.
Our results also challenge more recent extreme episodic theories that share the assumption
with LAFS that there is no phonological abstraction prior to lexical access (Bybee, 2001;
Goldinger, 1998; Hawkins, 2003; Johnson, 1997a, 1997b; Pierrehumbert, 2001, 2002). In the
Pierrehumbert (2002) perception model, for example, there is a prelexical stage of processing
(the Fast Phonological Preprocessor [FPP]), but the output of the FPP is not phonologically ab-
stract (an image of the output as “a grainy spectrogram” is suggested; p. 123). Goldinger also
proposed an extreme episodic model in which lexical entries are memory traces of each token
of each word that has been heard, complete with all perceptual details. Because this model has
been implemented (it is based on Hintzman’s, 1986, MINERVA 2 model), it is possible to use it
to test our claim that extreme episodic models cannot account for these data. Simulations show
that, if anything, the Goldinger model predicts the reverse of the pattern observed in the human
data (Cutler, Eisner, McQueen, & Norris, in press).
It is important to note that Goldinger (1998) did not explicitly rule out the possibility that the
input to the model could include abstract phonological representations as well as detailed
acoustic traces. However, if abstract representations were included, this would mean that it
would no longer be an extreme episodic model. To be consistent with our data, the Goldinger
model would have to be transformed into one in which the central burden of word recognition
was carried by abstract representations. Perceptual learning would have to take place exactly
as proposed here: Learning would occur by retuning the mapping between the input and ab-
stract representations. Our data cannot address whether abstract representations are stored
only once with each lexical representation or stored separately with each episodic trace. It is
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not clear, however, what purpose would be served by including abstract representations in lexi-
cal episodes instead of storing only a single abstract representation for each distinct alternative
pronunciation of a word. In a model where episodes also consist of abstract representations,
every episode of a word would contain exactly the same abstract knowledge.
The central problem with storing words as episodes is that the mapping between input and
word is performed primarily by the episodes corresponding to the specific word. Although the
form of the representation retrieved by an episodic model is influenced by the whole ensemble
of traces in the lexicon, there is no way of changing the mapping of specific phonemes within a
word without altering all of the episodes involved in recognizing that word. That is, the only
way to capture these data would be to alter the composition of a significant proportion of the
episodes (not just the words, but the actual episodes of those words) in the lexicon. As the sim-
ulations in Cutler et al. (in press) showed, simply adding new episodes is not sufficient to pro-
duce the correct retuning of the system. Without additional mechanisms, no amount of expo-
sure to the ambiguous fricative in contexts such as [wtlɔ?]) will affect the relative goodness of
fit of [do?] to previously stored episodes of doof and doos. In models where the mapping be-
tween input and the lexicon is achieved via abstract representations, however, all that is re-
quired is to alter the mapping between the input and the single perceptual category that needs
to be retuned.
Word recognition, therefore, cannot be based solely on comparison of lexical episodes.
However, as we noted at the outset, there is considerable evidence in support of episodic theo-
ries. Talker identity influences participants’ performance across a range of experimental tasks
(Goldinger, 1998), and there are many frequency and gradedness effects in speech production
(e.g., t/d deletion in English occurs more often in high- than in low-frequency words; Bybee,
2000; Pierrehumbert, 2002). These data are a challenge to abstractionist models, but only ex-
treme ones in which all acoustic detail is filtered out during speech recognition and forgotten.
An abstract lexicon for language comprehension and production could be combined with sepa-
rate storage of talker detail; similarly, frequency effects could arise in an abstractionist model
if, for example, multiple pronunciation variants were stored, if processing were probabilistic,
or both. However, the data on episodic effects do suggest that extreme abstractionist models
are incorrect. The present data show that extreme episodic models are also incorrect. No matter
how much of word recognition proves to be episodic, these data show that there must be ab-
straction in the lexical access process. Hybrid abstractionist–episodic models, therefore, hold
considerable promise. It will be essential in developing such models to specify which compo-
nents are episodic and which are abstract.
There are several benefits of abstraction using flexible prelexical representations. (These ar-
guments are presented in detail in Scharenborg, Norris, ten Bosch, & McQueen, 2005.) What
we have shown here is that abstraction makes listening more efficient when one encounters a
talker speaking in an unusual way. Listeners used their experience in the training phase to ben-
efit subsequent word recognition. Prelexical adjustments thus removed what would otherwise
have been a lexical ambiguity (e.g., doof vs. doos) in the test talker’s speech. This kind of learn-
ing, therefore, helps communication in later encounters with the same talker. These arguments,
and our results, suggest that an adequate model of spoken-word recognition must include flexi-
ble and abstract prelexical representations and, hence, also abstract lexical representations.
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Notes
1. Less extreme possible models along this continuum include a model in which multiple
acoustic traces are stored prelexically, but the content of lexical entries is phonologi-
cally abstract. If lexical representations are abstract, however, prelexical representa-
tions have to be abstract too, with the same vocabulary of representation at both levels;
otherwise, there could be no contact between prelexical and lexical processing. One
version of this model, therefore, is one in which, at the prelexical level, phonemes are
recognized episodically. With respect to the data to be presented here, this class of
model is indistinguishable from purely abstractionist models in which multiple traces
are stored neither lexically nor prelexically. Another intermediate possible model is one
in which abstract prototypes are stored at the prelexical level, but in which multiple
traces are stored in the lexicon. The content of lexical representations would have to be
phonologically abstract and would thus lack specification of full acoustic detail, but
there would be multiple exemplars of words (or pronunciation variants) rather than sin-
gle lexical prototypes. This class of model, because it requires prelexical abstraction, is
thus also not an extreme episodic model, as defined earlier. In fact, it is not clear that a
model like this should properly be termed episodic. All of the stored episodes for each
pronunciation variant would contain copies of exactly the same abstract representation.
Without any distinction between episodes, this model would just be a very inefficient
implementation of a purely abstract model.
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Appendix
Ambiguous/unrelated primes: doo?/krop, brie?/poen, hoe?/wrang, le?/ruim, kui?/bron, ka?/
wijd, lo?/taak, mu?/drang, gaa?/beuk, gro?/kraan, roo?/pak, lie?/pret, klui?/bang, poe?/wijn,
be?/krijt, gra?/boot, bo?/map, wij?/bruin, hal?/droom, loo?/gat.
Each pair of primes was paired with two targets: the f- and s-final versions of the ambiguous
primes (e.g., doo?/krop with doof and doos).
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